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Abstract—We derive an exponentially decaying upper-bound
on the unnormalized amount of information leaked to the wire-
tapper in Wyner’s wire-tap channel setting. We characterize the
exponent of the bound as a function of the randomness used
by the encoder. This exponent matches that of the recent work
of Hayashi [12] which is, to the best of our knowledge, the
best exponent that exists in the literature. Our proof (like those
of [16], [17]) is exclusively based on an i.i.d. random coding
construction while that of [12], in addition, requires the use of
random universal hash functions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wyner [1] introduced the notion of the wire-tap channel
(Fig. 1) in 1975: Alice wants to communicate a message
W ∈ {1, . . . ,M} to Bob through a communication channel
V : X → Y . Eve also has access to what Alice transmits via a
wire-tapper’s channel W : X → Z and the aim of Alice is to
keep the message hidden from her while maximizing the rate
of information transmitted to Bob, R , 1
n
logM .
W Alice’s Encoder
V : X → Y
W : X → Z
Bob’s Decoder
Eve
Wˆ
X
Y
Z
Fig. 1. The Wire-Tap Channel
To this end, Alice encodes W as a codeword X ∈ Xn and
sends it via n consecutive uses of the channel. Bob observes
the output sequence of V, Y ∈ Yn, and estimates W given
Y. On the other side, Eve has access to Z ∈ Zn (the output
sequence of W), and attempts to make an inference about W .
Wyner (in case when W is degraded with respect to V) [1]
and later Csisza´r and Ko¨rner (in a more general context of V
being more capable than W) [2] showed that, given any input
distribution PX , Alice can communicate reliably to Bob at any
rate R up to
I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z), (1)
(when (X,Y ) ∼ PX(x)V(y|x) and (X,Z) ∼ PX(x)W(z|x))
while keeping the rate of information leaked to Eve about W
as small as desired; i.e., guaranteeing
1
n
I(W ;Z) ≤ ǫ, (2)
for any ǫ > 0, using sufficiently large n.
Wyner’s measure of secrecy allows one to investigate the
trade-off between the message rate and the information leakage
rate but is too weak from the security point of view; even if
the amount of information Eve learns about the message W
normalized to the number of channel uses vanishes asymp-
totically, the amount itself can grow unboundedly as the
block-length increases. Therefore, it is natural to remove the
normalization factor in (2) and ask for strong secrecy:
I(W ;Z) ≤ ǫ. (3)
Maurer and Wolf showed that the highest achievable rate (1)
under strong secrecy requirement does not change [3].
Classical achievability constructions [1], [4] are based on
associating each message w ∈ {1, . . . ,M} with a sub-code
of size M ′ = exp(nR′) and transmitting a randomly chosen
codeword from that sub-code to communicate w. The relia-
bility of the code is ensured by keeping the total rate R′ +R
below I(X ;Y ). Furthermore, by varying the rate R′ from 0
to I(X ;Z), the upper-bound on the information leakage rate,
1
n
I(W ;Z), is controlled. Particularly, by choosing the rate R′
just below I(X ;Z), weak secrecy is established.
An alternative way to approach the secrecy problem is to
establish secrecy through channel resolvability [5]–[7]. Given
an input distribution PX that induces the distribution PZ at
the output of a channel W : X → Z , a code of rate I(X ;Z)
or larger chosen from the i.i.d. PX random coding ensemble
will, with high probability, induce an output distribution that
approximates PnZ when the index of the transmitted codeword
is chosen uniformly at random. [6], [8]–[11].
For any fixed message w ∈ {1, . . . ,M} the output of Eve’s
channel has distribution PZ|W=w. It is not difficult to see that
the secrecy is guaranteed if PZ|W=w ‘well approximates’ the
product distribution PnZ by setting the sub-codes’ rate R′ just
above I(X ;Z). In particular, if we measure the quality of
approximation by asking the unnormalized Kullback-Leibler
divergence between PZ|W=w and PnZ to be small, strong se-
crecy will be established. Indeed, in [6], [7] it has been shown
that the information leakage, I(W ;Z) will be exponentially
small in n provided that R′ is above I(X ;Z).
Definition 1. Given R, R′ and W, a number E is a secrecy ex-
ponent for the wire-tapper channel W, if there exist a sequence
of reliable coding schemes of rate R, requiring the entropy rate
R′ at the encoder, for which lim inf
n→∞
− 1
n
log[I(W ;Z)] ≥ E.
In [6], [7] the secrecy exponent is derived using i.i.d.
random coding ensemble. More specifically, each message
w ∈ {1, . . . ,M} is associated with a sub-code whose code-
words are independently (and independent of the codewords
of the other sub-codes) sampled from the i.i.d. random coding
ensemble. The exponent is derived by upper-bounding the
ensemble-expectation of D(PZ|W ‖PnZ |PW ) and then conclud-
ing that there exists a sequence of codes in the ensemble
using which the information leakage decays at least as fast
as E[D(PZ|W ‖P
n
Z |PW )] does. The secrecy exponent of Hou
and Kramer in [7] is derived based on their resolvability proof
of [8, Section III-A] which is simple but results in a small
exponent. However, by applying the method described in [8,
Section III-B] to the wire-tap channel setting a larger exponent
can be obtained which is equal to that of Hayashi in [6].
In [12], Hayashi uses privacy amplification to improve
the secrecy exponent based on a different construction than
those of [6]–[8]. In addition to a code of size MM ′, whose
codewords are sampled independently from the i.i.d. random
coding ensemble, a hash function is sampled from the en-
semble of universal hash functions from {1, . . . ,MM ′} to
{1, . . . ,M} and revealed to Alice, Bob, and Eve. A message
m ∈ {1, . . . ,M} is communicated by sending a randomly
chosen codeword from the code and, then, mapping the index
of the sent codeword, using the hash function, to an element
of {1, . . . ,M}. The expected information leakage (where
the expectation is taken over both i.i.d. random coding and
universal hash functions ensembles) is then upper-bounded to
show that the exponent of the bound is a secrecy exponent.
In this paper, we derive an exponentially decaying upper-
bound on E[D(PZ|W=w‖PnZ )], where the expectation is taken
over the i.i.d. random coding ensemble (i.e., the construction
used in [6]–[8]), by analyzing the deviations of PZ|W=w
from its mean. It then follows (by standard expurgation
arguments) that for ∀ǫ > 0, there exist a code of essentially
the same rate R, using which maxwD(PZ|W=w‖PnZ ) ≤
(1 + ǫ)E[D(PZ|W=w‖P
n
Z )]. As already noted in [7], this is a
worst-case measure of secrecy in contrast to I(W ;Z) which
is an average-case measure of secrecy. In addition, this shows
that our lower-bound on limn→∞− 1n logE[D(PZ|W=w‖P
n
Z )]
is a secrecy exponent. This exponent matches that of [12]
which is larger than those of [6]–[8].
II. NOTATION
We use uppercase letters (like X) to denote a random vari-
able and corresponding lowercase version (x) for a realization
of that random variable. The boldface letters denote sequences
of length n. The i-th element of a sequence x is denoted as
xi. We denote finite sets by script-style uppercase letters like
S. The cardinality of set S is denoted by |S|. For a positive
integer m, [[m]] , {1, 2, . . . ,m}. R denotes the set of real
numbers and R¯ = R ∪ {−∞,+∞} is the set of extended
real numbers. We write f(n) .= g(n) (resp. f(n) ≤˙ g(n)) if
limn→∞
1
n
log f(n)
g(n) = 0 (resp. ≤ 0).
We denote the set of distributions on alphabet X as P(X ).
If P ∈ P(X ), Pn ∈ P(Xn) denotes the product distribution
Pn(x) ,
∏n
i=1 P (xi). Likewise, if V : X → Y is a con-
ditional distribution Vn : Xn → Yn denotes the conditional
distribution Vn(y|x) =
∏n
i=1 V(yi|xi).
We denote the type of a sequence x ∈ Xn by Pˆx ∈ P(X )
and the conditional type of y ∈ Yn given x ∈ Xn by Vˆy|x :
X → Y (see [13, Chapter 2] for formal definitions).
A distribution Pˆ ∈ P(X ) is an n-type if nPˆ (x) ∈ N≥0
for ∀x ∈ X . We denote the set of n-types on X as
Pˆn(X ) ( P(X ) and use the fact that |Pˆn(X )| = O(n|X |)
[13, Lemma 2.2] repeatedly.
If Pˆ ∈ Pˆn(X ), we denote the set of all sequences of type
Pˆ as T
Pˆ
⊂ Xn. If Vˆ : X → Y is a conditional distribution,
the Vˆ-shell of x ∈ Xn, is denoted as T
Vˆ
(x) ⊂ Yn.
III. RESULT
In the rest of the paper (X,Z) ∈ X × Z denotes the pair
of random variables whose joint distribution is PX,Z(x, z) =
PX(x)W(z|x) where PX is a fixed input distribution. For
simplicity (and with no essential loss of generality) we assume
the supp(PX) = X and supp(PZ) = Z .1
Following [4] we consider the following random code
construction: for every message w ∈ [[M ]], a codebook of size
M ′ , exp(nR′), denoted by Cw, is constructed by sampling
M ′ codewords, Xw,w′ , w′ ∈ [[M ′]] independently from the
product distribution PnX . In order to communicate the message
w, Alice picks w′ ∈ [[M ′]] uniformly at random and transmits
Xw,w′ . Given such a construction, for every w ∈ [[M ]] and
z ∈ Zn, the conditional output distribution of W is
PZ|W (z|w) =
1
M ′
M ′∑
w′=1
Wn
(
z|Xw,w′
)
, (4)
which is an average of i.i.d. random variables and
E
[
PZ|W (z|w)
]
= PnZ (z), ∀w ∈ [[M ]]. (5)
Theorem 1. Using the aforementioned construction, for ∀w ∈
[[M ]],
E
[
D(PZ|W=w‖P
n
Z )
]
≤˙ exp[−nEs(PX ,W, R
′)].
with
Es(PX ,W, R
′) = max
0≤λ≤1
{
λR′ − F0(PX ,W, λ)
}
, (6)
where
F0(PX ,W, λ) , log
[∑
z∈Z
PZ(z)
∑
x∈X
PX|Z(x|z)
1+λPX(x)
−λ
]
.
Remark. F0(PX ,W, λ) is a convex function of λ (cf. Ap-
pendix E-B) passing through the origin with the slope
∂
∂λ
F0(PX ,W, λ)
∣∣∣
λ=0
= I(X ;Z).
Hence Es(PX ,W, R′) ≥ 0 with equality iff R′ ≤ I(X ;Z).
The only random quantity involved in the divergence
D(PZ|W=w‖P
n
Z ) is the conditional distribution PZ|W=w
whose expectation is PnZ as shown in (5). To prove Theorem 1
we shall analyze the deviations of the random variables
PZ|W (z|w) from their mean, PnZ (z).
As an immediate corollary to Theorem 1 we have:
1The second assumption follows from the first together with the assumption
that for ∀z ∈ Z there exist at least one x such that W(z|x) > 0.
Corollary 2. For any input distribution PX and a pair of rates
R and R′, there exists a reliable code of rate R using which,
for any message distribution PW ,
Pe ≤˙ exp[−nEr(PX ,V, R+R
′)],
I(W ;Z) ≤˙ exp[−nEs(PX ,W, R
′)],
where Pe denotes the decoding error probability of Bob and
Er is Gallager’s random coding exponent [14, Chapter 5].
Hence, for (R,R′) such that R + R′ < I(X ;Y ), the Es in
Theorem 1 is a secrecy exponent.
Corollary 2 is proved in Appendix B.
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
For ∀w ∈ [[M ]] and ∀z ∈ Zn let
Un(z|w) ,
PZ|W (z|w)
PnZ (z)
. (7)
Using (5), it is easy to see that E[Un(z|w)] = 1.
Using the linearity of expectation, we have:
E
[
D(PZ|W=w‖P
n
Z )
]
=
∑
z∈Zn
E
[
PZ|W (z|w) log
(PZ|W (z|w)
PnZ (z)
)]
=
∑
z∈Zn
PnZ (z)E
[
Un(z|w) log
(
Un(z|w)
)]
=
∑
Pˆ∈Pˆn(Z)
∑
z∈T
Pˆ
PnZ (z)E
[
Un(z|w) log
(
Un(z|w)
)]
. (8)
To prove Theorem 1, we shall use the following result.
Lemma 3. For P ∈ P(Z), let
G0(PX,Z , P, λ)
,
∑
z∈Z
P (z) log
[∑
x∈X
PX|Z(x|z)
1+λPX(x)
−λ
]
, (9)
and
Et(PX,Z , R
′, P ) , max
0≤λ≤1
{
λR′ −G0(PX,Z , P, λ)
}
. (10)
Then, for every w ∈ [[M ]],
E
[
Un(z|w) log
(
Un(z|w)
)]
≤˙ exp[−nEt(PX,Z , R
′, Pˆz)]. (11)
Having proved Lemma 3, Theorem 1 follows by using (11)
in (8) and [13, Lemma 2.6] to conclude
E
[
D(PZ|W=w‖P
n
Z )
]
≤˙ exp
[
−nEs(PX ,W, R
′)
]
,
where
Es(PX ,W, R
′)
, min
P∈P(Z)
{D(P‖PZ) + Et(PX,Z , R
′, P )}. (12)
Using (10), the equivalence of (12) and (6) is shown in
Appendix D. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Lemma 3: Pick any Pˆ ∈ Pˆn(Z) and observe
that for z ∈ T
Pˆ
,
Wn(z|x)
PnZ (z)
= exp
[
n
(
D(Vˆx|z‖PX |Pˆ )−D(Vˆx|z‖PX|Z |Pˆ )
)
].
For every P ∈ P(Z) and stochastic matrix Q : Z → X define
AX,Z(P ;Q) , D(Q‖PX |P )−D(Q‖PX|Z |P ). (13)
Thus, using (4),
Un(z|w) =
1
M ′
M ′∑
w′=1
exp
[
nAX,Z(Pˆ ; VˆXw,w′ |z)
] (14)
Let
A˜ ,
{
AX,Z(Pˆ ; Qˆ) for all conditional types Qˆ
}
⊂ R¯, (15)
and observe that |A˜| = O(n|X ||Z|). Set A , {a ∈ A˜ : a >
−∞} and for each a ∈ A define
Ta(z) ,
⋃
Qˆ:AX,Z(Pˆ ;Q)=a
T
Qˆ
(z) ⊆ Xn, (16)
where T
Qˆ
(z) is the Qˆ-shell of z and the union is over
conditional types Qˆ : Z → X (thus contains O(n|X ||Z|)
shells). Now we can rewrite (14) as2
Un , Un(z|w) =
1
M ′
∑
a∈A
Na exp(na), (17)
with Na , |{w′ : Xw,w′ ∈ Ta(z)}| denotes the number of
codewords of Cw in Ta(z). Since the codewords are indepen-
dent, Na is a Binomial(M ′, pa) random variable where,
pa = P
n
X
(
Ta(z)
)
=
∑
Qˆ:AX,Z (Pˆ ;Qˆ)=a
PnX
(
T
Qˆ
(z)
)
.
= exp
[
−n min
Qˆ:AX,Z(Pˆ ;Qˆ)=a
D(Qˆ‖PX |Pˆ )
]
. (18)
In the above, the second equality follows since Qˆ-shells are
disjoint, the third equality follows from [13, Lemma 2.6] (a
similar approach is used in [15] to express a quantity of interest
as a weighted sum of Binomial random variables).
In Appendix C-A we compute the value of
Eb(PX,Z , P, a) , min
Qˆ:AX,Z (P ;Qˆ)=a
D(Qˆ‖PX |P ) (19)
and, in particular, show that
Eb(PX,Z , P, a) ≥ a, (20)
with equality iff a = D(PX|Z‖PX |P ).
Partition A = A1 ∪A2 as
A1 = {a ∈ A : a ≤ R
′}, A2 = {a ∈ A : a > R
′},
2Since z and w are assumed to be fixed throughout the proof, we drop
them from the argument of Un for the sake of brevity.
Sn
Sn ln(Sn)
s
ψ(s)
(s− Sn)
2/Sn + Sn ln(Sn)
(s− Sn)
2/Sn
Fig. 2. The function ψ(s) defined in (24) and the upper-bound in (25). In
the figure Sn , E[Sn].
and split (17) as
Un =
1
M ′
∑
a∈A1
Na exp(na)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
,Sn
+
1
M ′
∑
a∈A2
Na exp(na)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
,Tn
.
For non-negative s and t and u , s+ t we have
u ln(u) = s ln(u) + t ln(u)
= s ln(s) + s ln(1 + t/s) + t ln(u)
≤ s ln(s) + t(1 + ln(u))
where the inequality follows since ln(1 + t/s) ≤ t/s. Hence,
E[Un log(Un)]
.
= E[Un ln(Un)]
≤ E[Sn ln(Sn)] + E
[
Tn
(
1 + ln(Un)
)]
. (21)
Moreover, since Un ≤ 1/PnZ (z), we have
ln(Un) ≤ ln
(
1/PnZ (z)
)
≤ n ln(1/p0)
where p0 , minz∈Z PZ(z) > 0. Thus, from (21) we have
E
[
Un ln(Un)
]
≤ E[Sn ln(Sn)] + (n ln(1/p0) + 1)E[Tn]
.
= E[Sn ln(Sn)] + E[Tn]. (22)
We now upper-bound each of the above expectations to
complete the proof.
First we note that for any constant c ∈ R,
E[Sn ln(Sn)] = E
[
Sn ln(Sn) + c(Sn − E[Sn])
]
. (23)
In particular,
E[Sn ln(Sn)] = E[ψ(Sn)]
where
ψ(s) , s ln(s)−
(
ln
(
E[Sn]
)
+1
)
(s− E[Sn]). (24)
One can check that (see Fig. 2)
ψ(s) ≤
(s− E[Sn])
2
E[Sn]
+ E[Sn] ln(E[Sn]) ≤
(s− E[Sn])
2
E[Sn]
,
(25)
where the last inequality follows since E[Sn] = 1−E[Tn] ≤ 1
as Sn and Tn are both non-negative random variables.
Using (25) in (23) we conclude that
E[Sn ln(Sn)] ≤
var(Sn)
E[Sn]
. (26)
We now have,
E[Sn] =
∑
a∈A1
pa exp(na)
.
= exp
[
−n min
a∈A1
{
Eb(PX,Z , Pˆ , a)− a
}]
, (27)
where the last equality follows since |A1| = O(n|X ||Z|).
Furthermore,
var(Sn) =
1
M ′2
∑
(a,a′)∈A2
1
exp[n(a+ a′)] cov(Na, Na′)
(a)
≤
1
M ′2
∑
(a,a′)∈A2
1
exp[n(a+ a′)]
√
var(Na)
√
var(Na′)
=
1
M ′2
(∑
a∈A1
exp[na]
√
var(Na)
)2
(b).
=
1
M ′2
(
max
a∈A1
{
exp[na]
√
var(Na)
})2
= max
a∈A1
{ 1
M ′2
exp[2na] var(Na)
}
(c)
≤ max
a∈A1
{ 1
M ′
exp[2na]pa
}
.
= exp
[
−n min
a∈A1
{
R′ + Eb(PX,Z , Pˆ , a)− 2a
}]
. (28)
In the above,
(a) follows by Cauchy–Schwarz inequality,
(b) follows since |A1| = O(n|X ||Z|),
(c) follows since var(Na) = M ′pa(1− pa) ≤M ′pa,
and finally (28) follows from (18) and (19).
Similar to (27),
E[Tn]
.
= exp
[
−n min
a∈A2
{
Eb(PX,Z , Pˆ , a)− a
}]
. (29)
Putting (27) and (28) in (26) together with (29) in (22) we
conclude that
Et(PX,Z , R
′, Pˆ ) =min{E1(PX,Z , R
′, Pˆ )− E¯2(PX,Z , R
′, Pˆ ),
E2(PX,Z , R
′, Pˆ )}, (30)
where
E1(PX,Z , R
′, Pˆ ) , min
a≤R′
{
R′ + Eb(PX,Z , Pˆ , a)− 2a
}
, (31)
E2(PX,Z , R
′, Pˆ ) , min
a>R′
{
Eb(PX,Z , P, a)− a
}
, (32)
E¯2(PX,Z , R
′, Pˆ ) , min
a≤R′
{
Eb(PX,Z , P, a)− a
}
. (33)
We now observe that:
i. lower-boundingR′ by a in (31) shows E1(PX,Z , R′, Pˆ )−
E¯2(PX,Z , R
′, Pˆ ) ≥ 0.
ii. by (20), one and only one of E2(PX,Z , R′, Pˆ ) or
E¯2(PX,Z , R
′, Pˆ ) is zero.
Thus (30) simplifies to
Et(PX,Z , R
′, Pˆ ) = min
{
E1(PX,Z , R
′, Pˆ ), E2(PX,Z , R
′, Pˆ )
}
(34)
In Appendix C-B we show that
E1(PX,Z , R
′, Pˆ ) = max
λ≤1
{
λR′ −G0(PX,Z , Pˆ , λ)
}
, (35a)
E2(PX,Z , R
′, Pˆ ) = max
λ≥0
{
λR′ −G0(PX,Z , Pˆ , λ)
}
. (35b)
Using the above in (34) concludes the proof.
V. DISCUSSION
We derived a lower-bound on the secrecy exponent of the
wire-tap channel using i.i.d. random codes. Comparing (6)
with [12, Equation (12)], we see that our exponent is equal
to that of [12] which is the best lower-bound on the secrecy
exponent among those reported in [6], [7], [12]. However, our
proof is based on a pure i.i.d. random coding construction and
does not require the ensemble of universal hash functions as an
additional tool. While this manuscript was in review, it came
to our attention that in [16], [17] also alternative derivations of
the same lower-bound are given based on pure i.i.d. random
coding constructions.
Our proof is a generalization of that of [8, Section III-A];
instead of partitioning the set of output sequences Zn into
two classes of typical and atypical sequences, we partition
it into O(n|Z|) type-classes to upper-bound the expected
unnormalized Kullback-Leibler divergence between the output
distribution and the desired product distribution PnZ . In addi-
tion, in Lemma 3, we bound the point-wise difference between
those distributions at each z ∈ Zn.
Furthermore, we believe that the method described here has
merit in showing the doubly exponential nature of the concen-
tration of the output distribution; as we see in (4), the output
distribution PZ|W (z|w) is an average of M ′ i.i.d. random
variables. If the distribution of the summands was independent
of M ′, the average would have concentrated around its mean
exponentially fast in M ′, that is doubly exponentially fast in n.
Although this is not the case, we see in the proof of Lemma 3
that among polynomially many summands in (17), only the
one corresponding to a = D(PX|Z‖PX |Pˆz) has a significant
contribution to the mean of Un(z|w) (which is a normalized
version of PZ|W (z|w)); the rest all have exponentially small
means. Applying the Chernoff bound to this particular term,
we see that if R′ > D(PX|Z‖PX |Pˆz) the dominant term
concentrates around its mean doubly exponentially fast in n.
In particular, there exists a class of wire-tapper channels for
which Un(z|w) consists only of this dominant term.3
The achievability constructions of [6]–[8], [12], [16], [17]
are based on i.i.d. random codes. It is an open question
whether random constant-composition codes [13] will lead
to a better secrecy exponent. We believe that our method is
easily adaptable to other types of random coding (some ideas
presented in [18] can also be useful in this direction). Another
important subject in the context of wire-tap channel is to derive
non-trivial upper-bounds on the secrecy exponent.
The performance of a wire-tap code is measured via two
quantities, the error probability and the information leakage,
3This happens if for ∀z ∈ Z , for every x ∈ X either W(z|x) = 0 or
W(z|x) = ǫz for some constant ǫz < 1 independent of x.
which are both shown to be exponentially decaying as a
function of the block-length n. The trade-off between these
exponents has been recently studied in [19].
We conclude our discussion by remarking that, as shown in
[2], for general channels V and W, any message rate up to
I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z),
where V⊸−X⊸−(Y, Z) form a Markov chain, is achievable.
Our results (and also those of others cited) are straightfor-
wardly extensible to the case when the channels are prefixed
with a channel PX|V and auxiliary random variable V is used.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF (5)
The right-hand-side of (4) is the average of identically
distributed random variables. The mean of each of them is
E
[ n∏
i=1
W (zi|Xi)
]
=
n∏
i=1
EX∼PX [W (zi|X)]
=
n∏
i=1
[∑
x∈X
PX(x)W(zi|x)
]
=
n∏
i=1
PZ(zi)
In the above, the first equality follows since the codewords are
sampled from the product distribution PnX .
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF COROLLARY 2
Let M , exp(nR) and construct 2M i.i.d. codebooks
of size M ′ , exp(nR′), Cw, w ∈ [[2M ]] by sampling each
codeword independently from the product distribution PnX . As
we already described, in order to communicate w ∈ [[2M ]],
Alice picks w′ ∈ [[M ′]] uniformly at random and transmits
Xw,w′ over the channel. The union of this codebooks C ,⋃
w∈[[2M ]] Cw is a random i.i.d. codebook of rate R′+R+
log(2)
n
.
Hence, using this ensemble for communicating over V, for
each w ∈ [[2M ]], the expected decoding error probability is
upper-bounded as
E
[
Pr[Wˆ 6= W |W = w]
]
≤ E
[
Pr[{Wˆ 6= W} ∪ {Wˆ ′ 6= W ′}|W = w
]
≤ exp
[
−nEr
(
PX ,V, R+R
′ + o(1)
)]
, (36)
due to [14, Theorem 5.6.2]. In the above, Wˆ and Wˆ ′ denote,
respectively, the maximum likelihood estimations of W and
W ′ given Y, the output sequence of V. Consequently,
E
[ 1
2M
2M∑
w=1
Pr[Wˆ 6= w|W = w]
]
≤˙ exp[−nEr(PX ,V, R +R
′)]. (37)
Likewise, Theorem 1 implies
E
[ 1
2M
2M∑
w=1
D(PZ|W=w‖P
n
Z )
]
≤˙ exp[−nEs(PX ,W, R
′)]. (38)
Therefore, there exists a code C∗ =
⋃
w∈[[2M ]] C
∗
w in the
ensemble using which we simultaneously have4:
1
2M
2M∑
w=1
Pr[Wˆ 6= w|W = w]
≤˙ exp[−nEr(PX ,V, R+R
′)]. (39)
1
2M
2M∑
w=1
D(PZ|W=w‖P
n
Z )
≤˙ exp[−nEs(PX ,W, R
′)]. (40)
Since each of the summands in (39) is positive, there exist
a subset W1 ⊂ {1, . . . , 2M} of cardinality |W1| ≥ 32M such
that, for ∀w ∈ W1,
Pr[Wˆ 6= w|W = w] ≤˙ 4 exp[−nEr(PX ,V, R+R
′)]. (41)
Similarly since the summands in (40) are positive, there exists
a subset W2 ⊂ {1, . . . , 2M} of cardinality |W2| ≥ 32M such
that, for ∀w ∈ W2,
D(PZ|W=w‖P
n
Z ) ≤˙ 4 exp[−nEs(PX ,W, R
′)]. (42)
Since |W1 ∩W2| ≥ M there exist a subset W ⊆ W1 ∩
W2 of cardinality |W| = M . The sub-code defined by the
messages in W ,
⋃
w∈W C
∗
w has rate R and, using that, for any
message distribution PW on W , we have:
Pe =
∑
w∈W
PW (w) Pr[Wˆ 6= w|W = w]
≤˙ exp[−nEr(PX ,V, R+R
′)],
due to (41), and
I(W ;Z) = D(PZ|W ‖P
n
Z |PW )−D(PZ‖P
n
Z )
≤
∑
w∈W
PW (w)D
(
PZ|W=w‖P
n
Z
)
≤˙ exp[−nEs(R
′, PX ,W)],
due to (42).
APPENDIX C
DERIVATION OF EXPONENTS FOR THE PROOF OF LEMMA 3
A. Derivation of Eb and It’s Properties
Proposition 4. Let Eb(PX,Z , P, a) be defined as in (19). Then,
Eb(PX,Z , P, a) = a+max
ρ∈R¯
{
ρa−G0(PX,Z , P, ρ)
}
, (43)
where G0 is defined in (9).
4Markov inequality implies for at least 2
3
of the codes in the ensemble,
1
2M
2M∑
w=1
Pr[Wˆ 6= w|W = w] ≤ 3E
[ 1
2M
2M∑
w=1
Pr[Wˆ 6= w|W = w]
]
.
Similarly for at least 2
3
of the codes in the ensemble,
1
2M
2M∑
w=1
D(PZ|W=w‖P
n
Z
) ≤ 3E
[ 1
2M
2M∑
w=1
D(PZ|W=w‖P
n
Z
)
]
.
Therefore, for at least 1
3
of the codes in the ensemble both (39) and (40) hold
simultaneously.
Proof: Let
ιX,Z(x, z) , log
(
PX,Z(x, z)
PX(x)PZ (z)
)
, ∀(x, z) ∈ X × Z,
denote the information density function for the joint distribu-
tion PX,Z for the sake of brevity.
Using (13),
min
Qˆ:AX,Z (P ;Qˆ)=a
D(Qˆ‖PX |P )
= a+ min
Qˆ:AX,Z(P ;Qˆ)=a
D(Qˆ‖PX|Z |P ) (44)
Now, we have
min
Qˆ:AX,Z(P ;Qˆ)=a
D(Qˆ‖PX|Z |P )
= min
Qˆ
{
D(Qˆ‖PX|Z |P ) + max
ρ∈R¯
ρ
(
a−AX,Z(P ; Qˆ)
)}
= min
Qˆ
max
ρ∈R¯
{
D(Qˆ‖PX|Z |P ) + ρ
(
a−AX,Z(P ; Qˆ)
)}
(∗)
= max
ρ∈R¯
{
min
Qˆ
{
D(Qˆ‖PX|Z |P )− ρAX,Z(P ; Qˆ)
}
+ ρa
}
where (*) follows since D(Qˆ‖PX|Z |P ) is a convex function
of Qˆ and AX,Z(P ; Qˆ) is a linear function of Qˆ. Therefore,
D(Qˆ‖PX|Z |P ) − ρAX,Z(P ; Qˆ) is also a convex function of
Qˆ and we can swap the min and the max. Now,
D(Qˆ‖PX|Z |P )− ρAX,Z(Pˆ ; Qˆ)
=
∑
z∈Z
P (z)
∑
x∈X
Qˆ(x|z) log
(
Qˆ(x|z)
PX|Z(x|z) exp[ριX,Z(x, z)]
)
≥
∑
z∈Z
P (z) log
(
1∑
x∈X PX|Z(x|z) exp[ριX,Z(x, z)]
)
with equality iff Qˆ(x|z) ∝ PX|Z(x|z) exp[ριX,Z(x, z)] (using
the concavity of logarithm). Therefore,
min
Qˆ
{
D(Qˆ‖PX|Z |P )− ρAX,Z(P ; Qˆ)
}
+ ρa = ρa
−
∑
z∈Z
P (z) log
(∑
x∈X
PX|Z(x|z) exp[ριX,Z(x, z)]
)
.
Remark. It is easy to verify that Eb(PX,Z , P, a) is a convex
function of a. Furthermore, (44) implies Eb(PX,Z , P, a) ≥ a
with equality at a = D(PX|Z‖PX |P ).
B. Derivation of E1 and E2
Proof of (35a): Using (31),
E1(PX,Z , R
′, P ) = min
a≤R′
{
R′ + Eb(PX,Z , P, a)− 2a
}
= min
a∈R¯
{
R′ + Eb(PX,Z , P, a)− 2a+max
λ≤0
λ(R′ − a)
}
= min
a∈R¯
max
λ≤0
{
(1 + λ)R′ + Eb(PX,Z , P, a)− (2 + λ)a
}
= min
a∈R¯
max
λ≤1
{
λR′ + Eb(PX,Z , P, a)− (1 + λ)a
}
(∗)
= max
λ≤1
{
λR′ +min
a∈R¯
{
Eb(PX,Z , P, a)− (1 + λ)a
}}
, (45)
where (*) follows since Eb(PX,Z , P, a) is convex in a. Using
(43) we have
min
a∈R¯
{
Eb(PX,Z , P, a)− (1 + λ)a
}
= min
a∈R¯
{
max
ρ∈R¯
{
ρa−G0(PX,Z , P, ρ)
}
− λa
}
= min
a∈R¯
max
ρ∈R¯
{
(ρ− λ)a−G0(PX,Z , P, ρ)
}
(∗)
= max
ρ∈R¯
{
min
a∈R¯
{
(ρ− λ)a
}
−G0(PX,Z , P, ρ)
}
, (46)
where again (*) follows since G0(PX,Z , P, ρ) is convex in ρ
(cf. Appendix E-A). We then note that the minimum of the
linear term (ρ−λ)a over the choices of a is −∞ unless ρ = λ.
Therefore, the result of (46) is
min
a∈R¯
{
Eb(PX,Z , P, a)− (1 + λ)a
}
= −G0(PX,Z , P, λ) (47)
Plugging the above into (45) completes the proof.
Proof of (35b): Similarly, using (32),
E2(PX,Z , R
′, P ) = min
a>R′
{
Eb(PX,Z , P, a)− a
}
= min
a∈R¯
{
Eb(PX,Z , P, a)− a+max
λ≥0
λ(R′ − a)
}
= min
a∈R¯
max
λ≥0
{
λR′ + Eb(PX,Z , P, a)− (1 + λ)a
}
(∗)
= max
λ≥0
{
λR′ +min
a∈R¯
{
Eb(PX,Z , P, a)− (1 + λ)a
}}
, (48)
where (*) follows since Eb(PX,Z , P, a) is convex in a. Using
(47) in (48) completes the proof.
APPENDIX D
DERIVATION OF Es
Plugging (10) into (12) we have
min
P∈P(Z)
{
Et(PX,Z , P,R
′) +D(P‖PZ)
}
= min
P∈P(Z)
{
max
0≤λ≤1
{λR′ −G0(PX,Z , P, λ)} +D(P‖PZ)
}
(∗)
= max
0≤λ≤1
{
λR′ + min
P∈P(Z)
{D(P‖PZ)−G0(PX,Z , P, λ)}
}
where (*) follows since G0, defined in (9) is a linear function
of P while D(Pˆ‖PZ) is convex in P and we can swap the
min and the max. The claim follows then by observing that
D(P‖PZ)−G0(PX,Z , P, λ)
=
∑
z∈Z
P (z)
[
log
(
P (z)
PZ(z)
)
−
− log
(∑
x∈X
PX|Z(x|z)
1+λPX(x|z)
−λ
)]
≥ log

 1∑
z∈Z
PZ(z)
∑
x∈X
(
PX|Z(x|z)
1+λPX(x)
−λ
)

 ,
with equality if
P (z) ∝ PZ(z)
∑
x∈X
(
PX|Z(x|z)
1+λPX(x)
−λ
)
,
using the concavity of logarithm.
APPENDIX E
CONVEXITY PROOFS
Lemma 5. Let ai > 0, and bi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , k be arbitrary
real numbers. Then the function
f(s) , log
( k∑
i=1
aib
s
i
)
,
is convex in s for ∀s ∈ R¯.
Proof: Pick s1 < s2 and t ∈ (0, 1). Let t¯ , 1 − t and
s , ts1 + t¯s2. Then, Ho¨lder’s inequality implies
k∑
i=1
aib
s
i =
k∑
i=1
(
atib
ts1
i ×a
t¯
ib
t¯s1
i
)
≤
( k∑
i=1
aib
s1
i
)t( k∑
i=1
aib
s2
i
)t¯
.
Taking the log of both sides of the above concludes the proof.
Lemma 6. Suppose fi(s), i = 1, 2, . . . , k are convex functions
in s and ai > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , k is a sequence of real numbers.
Then,
(i) f(s) ,∑ki=1 aifi(s) is convex in s.
(ii) g(s) , log
(∑k
i=1 ai exp[fi(s)]
)
is convex in s.
Proof: The convexity of f(s) is trivial. To prove the
convexity of g(s), let s1 < s2 and s = ts1 + t¯s2 for some
t ∈ (0, 1) (where t¯ , 1− t). Then
k∑
i=1
ai exp[fi(s)] ≤
k∑
i=1
ai exp[tfi(s1) + (1− t)fi(s2)]
=
k∑
i=1
(
ati exp[tfi(s1)]× a
t¯
i exp[t¯fi(s2)]
)
≤
( k∑
i=1
ai exp[fi(s1)]
)t( k∑
i=1
ai exp[fi(s2)]
)t¯
where the second inequality follows by Ho¨lder’s inequality.
Taking the logarithm of both sides of the above proves (ii).
Convexity of the functions F0 and G0 is established using
the above two lemmas as follows:
A. Convexity of G0
Set ai = PX|Z(x|z) and bi =
PX|Z (x|z)
PX (x)
in Lemma 5 and
then use Lemma 6 part (i).
B. Convexity of F0
Set ai = PX|Z(x|z) and bi =
PX|Z (x|z)
PX (x)
in Lemma 5 and
then use Lemma 6 part (ii).
